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NEPA AND THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: A 
PROSPECT FOR DISCLOSURE 
By Gilda M. Tuoni* 
I. A SEASON FOR INFORMATION 
The 1960's saw a new wave of active public interest in govermnen-
tal affairs sweep across the country. From this current, groups and 
individuals emerged seeking greater participatory roles in the work-
ings of their government. Interested citizenry, desiring to become 
knowledgeable of governmental affairs, brought to Congress their 
requests for opening up the files of government agencies. 
In response to this trend, Congress passed the Acts which this 
article discusses: the Freedom of Information Act of 1966 (FOIA), 1 
and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).2 Con-
gress intended the Freedom of Information Act to make accessible 
governmental materials that had previously been unavailable to the 
public. The FOIA, which amended Section 3 of the 20-year-old 
Administrative Procedure Act, 3 was intended to clarify and protect 
the right of the public to information.4 
Before NEPA, there was no one measure expressing national envi-
ronmental priorities, goals and aspirations. NEPA was the first 
Congressional policy for the management of the country's present 
and future environment.5 The implementation of this policy de-
pended partially on making public certain information on the envi-
ronmental effects of governmental action. Through NEPA, Con-
gress required the responsible federal agencies to consider the envi-
ronmental effects of their actions and to disclose fully such prelimi-
nary considerations in the form of environmental impact state-
ments.8 
Both Acts certainly opened many governmental agencies to pub-
lic scrutiny. The NEPA provisions requiring the submission of envi-
ronmental impact statements have been conscientiously enforced 
by the federal courts, usually at the request of public interest liti-
gants.7 FOIA, on the other hand, has not been as effective as was 
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hoped. Although it has given interested individuals access to a great 
deal of government information, its exemptions of materials such as 
Executive-declared national security concerns and internal agency 
memoranda8 have been used to justify the nondisclosure of much 
information concerning agency actions. 
This article discusses the overlapping public information func-
tions of NEPA and FOIA. It evaluates both Acts as tools for the 
disclosure of the facts concerning the environmental effects of gov-
ernment action. Finally, it argues that information previously pro-
tected by the exemptions of the Freedom of Information Act may 
be required by NEPA to be made public. 
II. THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 
Out of growing Congressional concern with the secrecy of agency 
practices and procedures came the Freedom of Information Act of 
1966. The Act amended Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure 
Act of 1946 (APA). That section was a disclosure provision, but it 
contained broad areas of exemption and became an ineffective in-
formation tool. The "public information" section of the APA made 
information available only to "persons properly and directly con-
cerned."9 Nondisclosure was permitted if secrecy was required "in 
the public interest," ifrecords related solely to agency internal man-
agement, or for any "good cause found."lo 
The Freedom of Information Act established the affirmative prin-
ciple that all persons may have access to government records, with 
certain exceptions. It eliminated the vague areas of exemption in 
the Administrative Procedure Act and set up workable standards to 
determine exemption from public disclosure. The Act provided a 
procedure for citizen suits in federal district court contesting agency 
nondisclosure." Some provisions in the Act, however, work in derog-
ation of the overall policy of full disclosure. First, all requests for 
information under FOIA must be for "identifiable" records. 12 Sec-
ond, the new Act also exempts from its scope nine areas of sensitive 
concern. 13 These exemptions differ from the previous broad exemp-
tions in that they delineate the matters to be exempt and provide a 
procedural mechanism for the classification of secret documents. 
The exemptions are the sole means by which officials may refuse to 
disclose data. 
A. Interpretation Through Environmental Litigation 
Government agencies reluctant to comply with disclosure have 
looked most frequently to exemptions 1 and 5 to support nondisclo-
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sure. Exemption 1 excludes matters "specifically required by Exec-
utive order to be kept secret in the interests of national defense or 
foreign policy;"14 and Exemption 5 makes disclosure provisions in-
applicable to "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters 
which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency 
in litigation with the agency."15 The two exemptions constitute 
effective defenses for nondisclosure, especially as they have been 
interpreted in recent environmental case law. 
In an early case, Soucie v. David,16 the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia narrowly construed the inter-, intra-agency 
memorandum exemption and limited its applicability. That court 
allowed in camera inspection of a government intra-agency report 
on aspects of the supersonic transport program for a determination 
of whether public access to the document was requiredY Rather 
than allowing the agency decision on disclosure to be final, the court 
required judicial review, warning that: " ... courts must beware of 
the inevitable temptation of a governmental litigant to give [this 
exemption] an expansive interpretation in relation to the particular 
records in issue."18 
However encouraging such a decision was, its effect was soon cast 
into doubt by the Supreme Court decision in EPA v. Mink. lo Con-
gresswoman Patsy Mink sought, under the Freedom of Information 
Act, the disclosure of certain documents concerning a proposed nu-
clear test off Amchitka Island near the coast of Alaska. The Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency had provided the President with these 
documents, which included recommendations on the advisability of 
the underground testing. The EPA said that all the documents in 
question were either classified or inter-agency and intra-agency 
memoranda and accordingly could be withheld from public view. 
The Court of Appeals had favored in camera examination of the 
documents to determine whether the "secret" components could be 
sifted out, separating the factual data from deliberative agency dis-
cussion, disclosing the former. 20 The Supreme Court, however, over-
turned the Court of Appeals' order which had directed an in camera 
inspection. Mr. Justice White, writing for the Court, denied in 
camera examination for the purpose of separating "secret" from 
"non-secret" materials. He stated: 
What has been said thus far makes wholly untenable any claim that 
the Act intended to subject the soundness of executive security classifi-
cations to judicial review at the insistence of any objecting citizen. It 
also negates the proposition that Exemption 1 authorizes or permits in 
camera inspection of a contested document bearing a single classifica-
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tion so that the court may separate the secret from the supposedly 
nonsecret and order disclosure of the latter.2! 
Concerning the internal memoranda exemption, Justice White 
stated that although the exemption did not prohibit in camera 
inspection of purely factual matter, neither did it require it. 22 He 
explained that the historical interpretation of the exemption re-
flected important public policy imperatives for nondisclosure. Re-
ferring to Congressional discussion of Exemption 5, he noted the 
Congressional concern that frank discussion of legal and/or policy 
matters by agencies would be impossible if such remarks were open 
to public scrutiny. The efficiency of governmental operations would 
be severely hampered if agencies were forced to "operate in a fish-
bowl."23 Justice White noted the opinion in Kaiser Aluminum & 
Chemical Corporation v. U.S.,24 where the United States Court of 
Claims had reasoned: 
There is public policy involved in this claim of privilege for this advisory 
opinion-the policy of open, frank discussion between subordinate and 
chief concerning administrative action.25 
Justice White concluded that the Environmental Protection Agency 
could avoid in camera inspection by demonstrating through affida-
vits and testimony that the documents requested were deliberative 
rather than factual in nature. 
The decision in Mink seemed to minimize the effectiveness of 
FOIA. Mr. Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion, stated that 
"the much advertised Freedom of Information Act is on its way to 
becoming a shambles," if documents can be withheld from in 
camera inspection merely by stamping them "Secret."28 Thus under 
FOIA, plaintiffs in environmental litigation could be denied access 
to relevant information either by virtually non-reviewable executive 
classifications of matters as national security concerns, and/or by 
agency characterization of materials as deliberative or as inter- or 
intra-departmental. 
A case following Mink further diluted the effect of the FOIA dis-
closure provisions. Montrose Chemical v. Train27 broadened the ex-
clusions set out in Mink. The Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia held that summaries of the EPA's considerations of 
purely factual environmental matters constituted part of the delib-
erative process protected by Exemption 5 of the Act. The documents 
at issue were summary records of hearings held pursuant to the 
Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act,28 to determine 
whether continued use of DDT should be banned. A chemical com-
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pany brought an action under FOIA seeking the summaries utilized 
by the EPA in making a decision unfavorable to the company. After 
in camera inspection of the documents, the District Court, deleting 
minor portions of the documents, ruled that they must be dis-
closed.29 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed, relying 
on the protective nature of Exemption 5: 
This Circuit and others have emphasized that the purpose of Exemp-
tion 5 is not simply to encourage frank intra-agency discussion of policy, 
but also to ensure that the mental processes of decision-makers are not 
subject to public scrutiny. 30 
The court held that summaries of factual material prepared by 
agency staff and used in administrative decision making were part 
of the deliberative process and exempt from disclosure. Thus, even 
factual material was protected by an exemption supposedly in-
tended to protect deliberative material. 
Although the substantive result of the decision (the cancelling of 
DDT registrations), may have been immediately desirable to envi-
ronmentalists, the long-range implications for disclosure were not. 
Montrose established restrictive disclosure principles for environ-
mental cases. Such matters often involve lengthy and diverse testi-
mony and hearing records, and litigants under FOIA would want to 
focus on the portions of the materials upon which agency judgment 
was based. If agency summaries of such factual material are consid-
ered to be part of the deliberative process and therefore non-
disclosable, there is not much public information available. 
One issue that both cases raise and fail to resolve is the standard 
of proof necessary to trigger either exemption's coverage. The Su-
preme Court in Mink did suggest that proof through agency explan-
atory affidavits or oral testimony would be adequate.31 The Court 
did not detail, however, what specific elements would be required 
in these agency assertions. Litigating parties, not knowing exactly 
what constitutes interdepartmental memoranda or Executive-
ordered national security concerns, cannot effectively challenge 
agency determinations that certain documents come within the pro-
tective exemptions. Under the Act, the courts were given no explicit 
directive for in camera review of agency decisions. The power and 
standards of judicial review in this area were vague indeed. 
B. Remedial Legislation-The FOIA Amendments 
In a concurring opinion in EPA v. Mink, Mr. Justice Stewart 
defended the majority's interpretation of the Freedom of Informa-
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tion Act and pointed out that Congress, not the Court, had "or-
dained unquestioning deference to the Executive's use of the 'secret' 
stamp."32 He found that by enactment of Exemption 1, Congress 
chose to decree a "blind acceptance of Executive fiat."33 Justice 
Stewart deemed Congress responsible for the Act's effects, however 
frustrating to disclosure they might be. He suggested that only Con-
gress could change the thrust of FOIA's exemptions. 
In the wake of Mink and Montrose, serious Congressional concern 
arose. Legislation was formulated setting time limitations on agency 
response to requests for information34 and cutting the excessive fees 
previously required of FOIA litigants.35 Additionally, the amend-
ments to the Freedom of Information Act replaced the requirement 
that requests be for specifically identifiable records with the re-
quirement that requests "reasonably describe" the desired mate-
ria1. 36 Thus citizens were better able to require agencies to disgorge 
requested records, even where they could not provide the exact file 
numbers. The amendments were passed by Congress in the early fall 
of 1974. 
More importantly, the amendments sought to stop abuses of Ex-
emptions 1 and 5. Congress established specific criteria to deter-
mine exemption coverage. Judicial inspection of the documents was 
explicitly authorized to facilitate inquiries into the propriety of 
withholding documentsY Similarly, the amendments authorized 
court determinations of whether certain portions could be severed 
from nondisclosable sections and disclosed without loss of mean-
ing.3s The amendments gave reviewing courts the discretionary right 
to examine all documents in camera. 
In one of his first confrontations with the legislative branch, Presi-
dent Gerald Ford vetoed the measure on October 17,1974. Congress 
responded quickly. The veto was denounced as perpetuating the 
"insidious secrecy that characterized the Watergate years, "39 and 
members of Congress called for the repudiation of "traditional bu-
reaucratic secrecy. "40 The vetoed amendments subsequently were 
passed by the necessary two-thirds majority of both Houses, and 
became law. 
The amended Act, however, still does not seem to be entirely 
satisfactory. The courts now have much discretion in the inspection 
of withheld documents, but problematical exemptions remain. Ex-
emption 1, as amended, reads: 
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are-
(l)(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Ex-
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ecutive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or 
foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such 
Executive order;41 
Congress has set no standards of "proper" classifications under Ex-
emption 1. Absent a showing of arbitrariness or bad faith, Executive 
and agency decisions are presumably still the final word. 
The amendments to FOIA do not touch the inter-, intra-agency 
exemption. The Act affords no procedure for citizen participation in 
or review of agency decisional considerations and disclosure proce-
dures. The "deliberative process" guarded by the courts in Mink 
and Montrose appears to have retained its protective shield. Thus, 
while the Freedom of Information Act amendments accomplished 
some changes, a more complete renovation is still needed. 
m. NEPA-ITS DEVELOPMENT AS A DISCLOSURE TOOL; A SOLUTION 
To FOIA SHORTCOMINGS 
Both NEPA and the FOIA have moved some distance through 
judicial interpretation of their directives. However, as to informa-
tion on the environmental effects of agency action, NEPA seems to 
be the more forceful disclosure law. 
NEPA was originally intended to "contribute to a more orderly, 
rational, and constructive Federal response to environmental deci-
sion making."42 Congress had in mind several schemes of implemen-
tation. NEPA sought to establish a national environmental policy 
to guide Federal activities and incorporated certain "action-
forcing" procedures to assure implementation. 43 It required agency 
consideration of the environmental impact of existing or planned 
programs with research and study of ecological systems and envi-
ronmental quality.44 It authorized the creation of the Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ), and required the submission of an 
annual Executive report on the status and progress of the Nation's 
environmental systems. 45 
The reach of the Act as a disclosure tool was uncertain in its early 
days because it was unclear exactly what agency actions were to be 
covered. Through litigation, however, NEPA has developed into 
what has been labeled an "environmental full disclosure law."46 
Judicial interpretation has given strength to NEPA mandates, espe-
cially the "action-forcing" § 102(2)(C) which requires submission of 
environmental impact statements.47 
Section 102(2)(C)(v) requires that environmental impact state-
ments and relevant agency comments "be made available to the 
President, the Council on Environmental Quality and to the public 
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as provided by section 552 of Title 5, United States Code 
[FOIA) ... "48 However, it has never been established that the 
restrictions of FOIA have also been brought into NEP A. On the 
contrary, Executive Orders, CEQ Guidelines and court interpreta-
tion have mandated "full disclosure" as the rule, allowing a narrow-
ing of NEPA information provisions in only the most compelling 
circumstances. 49 Application of NEPA mandates to those areas 
where FOIA disclosure provisions have failed presents a possible 
solution to the difficulties experienced by public interest litigants. 
A. The Basis for Judicial Review 
Over the five working years of the Act, the courts have actively 
reviewed demands by citizens for NEPA's implementation. The 
mood of the country was ripe for the Act's enforcement. Courts were 
already concerned with the decision-making process of agencies, 
and NEPA was enacted at the height of such disquiet. The nation 
had become concerned about environmental abuses and citizens 
sought judicial control over governmental actions affecting finite 
environmental resources. 
NEPA mandates procedures to be followed, although it may not 
require agencies to reach the substantively pro-environmental re-
sults of the policy-declaring sections of the Act. 50 From the first days 
of NEPA litigation, the Act's strength was within the enumerated 
procedural requirements of Title 1, § 102(2)(C). This section re-
quires agency preparation of a detailed statement of the "environ-
mental impact of the proposed action," including "alternatives" to 
such action. 51 NEPA became a full disclosure law through the case-
by-case enforcement of the provisions of § 102(2)(C). 
Two early cases established judicial oversight as an important 
aspect of NEP A enforcement even in the absence of a judicial review 
provision in the Act itself. In Environmental Defense Fund v. 
Hardin,52 an action to enjoin the Secretary of Agriculture from em-
ploying certain chemicals in a federal-state insecticide program, the 
District Court for the District of Columbia held that independent 
review under NEP A could take place even if another Act was also 
relevant to the agency action examined. In Citizens for Clean Air 
v. Corps of Engineers,53 an action to determine the validity of a 
construction permit, the District Court for the Southern District of 
New York stated that judicial review was "crucial to NEPA imple-
mentation."54 In that case the court enforced NEPA by declaring 
that failure of the Corps of Engineers to evaluate the environmental 
impact of its permit for the construction of a water intake system 
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to be used in a proposed power plant rendered the permit invalid. 55 
Thus the project could not proceed without an impact statement. 
The courts then began to assert jurisdiction to review agency 
actions and enforce compliance with NEPA. Preliminary determi-
nations of whether a controversy came under NEPA and its require-
ments became significant. Judicial inquiry also focused on the 
standing of plaintiffs to challenge governmental action, interpreta-
tion of the language of the Act, exemptions from coverage and the 
prescribed content of impact statements submitted. 
The results of FOIA controversies may very well have been differ-
ent under NEPA. NEPA as interpreted requires federal agency com-
pliance in disclosing certain information, and it consequently makes 
agency action a more open process. In practice, NEPA narrows the 
FOIA exemptions because it weighs the balance in favor of public 
disclosure of environmental information. In the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act cases, the disclosure mechanism of § 102(2)(C) ofNEPA 
might have been made to operate. NEPA could provide a basis upon 
which a litigant could challenge agency failure to produce impact 
statements containing information as to the environmental effects 
of proposed actions. Although it may be argued that the Freedom 
of Information Act alone governs certain controversies, the option 
of an independent review under NEPA has been established by 
Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin. 
B. Standing to Sue 
NEPA plaintiffs must establish that they are involved in actual 
controversies capable of judicial resolution. 56 Constitutional require-
ments for standing call, among other things, for "injury in fact" 
suffered or to be suffered as a result of the actions in questionY The 
Supreme Court has held that injury in fact includes harm to "aes-
thetic, conservational, recreational or spiritual values," as well as 
economic interests.58 In Sierra Club v. Morton,59 petitioners sought 
an injunction to restrain federal officials from approving an 
extensive ski area development in the Mineral King Valley of the 
Sequoia National Forest. The Supreme Court held that a person 
seeking judicial review must allege injury to himself, whether eco-
nomic or otherwise, to satisfy standing requirements.6o Although the 
Sierra Club claimed a special interest in the conservation and the 
sound maintenance of the national parks, game refuges and forests 
of the country,61 the Court found that this interest was "not suffi-
cient by itself to render the organization 'adversely affected' or 'ag-
grieved.' "62 
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However, the rule that plaintiffs must allege "injury in fact" to 
themselves from agency actions was eventually given special inter-
pretation in NEPA cases. Sierra Club v. Mason83 was an action in 
which the District Court for the District of Connecticut enjoined the 
dredging of New Haven Harbor and the deposit of the materials into 
Long Island Sound. The court held that a plaintiff could establish 
standing by alleging that the proposed federal action threatened the 
quality of the environment where he lived or worked or enjoyed 
recreational activity.84 The court found that such a test was particu-
larly appropriate in a suit seeking to require an impact statement 
where there is little public knowledge about the environmental ef-
fects of the proposed action.85 
In SCRAP v. United States,88 an action seeking an injunction 
against an Interstate Commerce Commission order, the District of 
Columbia District Court set an even more lenient standard. The 
plaintiff organization alleged that its members used the "forests, 
streams, mountains, and other resources. . . for camping, hiking, 
fishing and sightseeing,"87 and that this use was disturbed by the 
adverse environmental impact caused by the ICC action. The court 
found that "aesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic 
well-being," were important ingredients in the quality of life in 
society.88 These interests were to be legally protected even if they 
were only shared by the plaintiffs with the public at large.au 
These two latter cases, although not departing significantly from 
Sierra Club v. Morton, have expanded both the class of those in-
jured and the nature of injuries suffered in NEPA controversies. 
Frederick R. Anderson, in his commentary on NEP A standing re-
quirements, suggests that the Act may create: 
. . .new legal interests which enlarge the category of injuries which 
the public may sustain, so that harm to the public's right to know, to 
participate, and to have the interests of future generations protected 
may constitute injury in fact.70 
NEPA thus provides citizens with new ways to challenge federal 
agency action. 
The first problem in applying NEPA to FOIA cases is standing. 
Consider the Mink case as if it were a NEPA suit, and recall the 
enlarged category of new interests which NEPA may create. The 
plaintiff could argue under NEPA that the Amchitka tests consti-
tuted a very real physical threat of injury to the environment; and 
alternatively, that agency refusal to disclose information concerning 
the nuclear test through an adequate impact statement threatened 
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harm to the public's "right to know" and thus to participate in 
governmental decision making which affects the environment, as 
NEPA intended. The availability of the litigant's cause of action 
under NEPA would be established and standing requirements 
would be met. 
C. When is an Impact Statement Required? 
A second problem in triggering the disclosure mechanism of 
NEPA is that §102(2)(C) applies only to those "major Federal ac-
tions," "significantly" affecting the environment.71 These factors, 
prescribed by the language of the Act itself, determine whether 
federal action requires the submission of an environmental impact 
statement. 
The focus of this inquiry is on the degree of federal involvement 
in environmental actions. Problem cases concern private actions in 
federal areas, and federal fun dings of otherwise private actions. 
Where federal control over private action has been exclusive or 
where federal and state control have been combined, courts have 
found sufficient federal action to meet the requirements of § 
102(2)(C).72 Where federal monies totally or in part fund private or 
state actions, "federal action" has been found. 73 The evaluation of 
direct or indirect federal participation has not caused much diffi-
culty, and the slightest federal involvement has been found to con-
stitute federal action. 74 
A more complex concern is the determination of "major" actions 
"significantly affecting the environment." Some courts have ap-
plied differentiated formulas, but whether an action is a "major" 
one has frequently been dependent upon the significance of its envi-
ronmental effects. Thus, in some circuits, the test for both factors 
is singular. In Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird,75 the Maine 
District Court applied such a test. That court found that an impact 
statement was not required in the Navy's mock amphibious attack 
on an oceanside park because of the insignificant environmental 
effects of the project. In dicta, the court noted that NEPA required 
all federal agencies to incorporate into their planning processes con-
sideration of the environmental consequences of proposed actions. 
Whenever these considerations indicated that actions might signifi-
cantly affect the quality of the environment, agencies were to pre-
pare and file detailed impact statements.78 
In deciding what actions are major and of significant effect, the 
courts have considered the Guidelines set by the Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality. The Council is an advisory body created by 
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Title IT, § 202 of NEPA.77 The Council Guidelines interpret NEPA 
mandates and direct agency compliance. Courts view the Guide-
lines as suggestions for NEPA implementation rather than as en-
forceable legal requirements.78 The CEQ's role has been described 
as follows: 
... the council still does not officially approve or disapprove particu-
lar agency procedures, statements, or failure to prepare statements, 
relying instead on informal consultation, although it has played an ac-
tive role in getting the agencies to prepare their own procedures for 
NEPA compliance, has guided them to a broad reading of the Act, in 
the CEQ Guidelines, and has occasionally criticized particular state-
ments on a non-systematic, ex parte basis.78 
The pertinent Guidelines define the size and importance of fed-
eral action necessary for the operation of NEPA and they seem to 
visualize NEPA as covering a broad range of federal action.so 
In applying NEPA to the FOIA cases, the determination that an 
action is a "major" one significantly affecting the environment is 
crucial. This requirement might be met by several approaches. In 
Mink, the application of large-scale planning, time, resources and 
expenditures to a nuclear testing program could be proof of the 
existence of a major action.81 Another approach is to apply a 
reasonable-man standard; i.e., what ordinary persons would view a 
major action to be. Certainly, the average person regards nuclear 
testing, even underground, as an awesome and major action. The 
Mink plaintiff could have also suggested the singular test found in 
Citizens for Reid State Park in support of her attempt to gather 
information regarding the possible environmental effects of the nu-
clear explosions. A showing of the great environmental harm that 
nuclear testing had created in the past and could create again, 
would seem to meet the requirement of a major action significantly 
affecting the environment. 
The CEQ Guidelines present other means of satisfying these re-
quirements in FOIA cases, and they could be persuasive to a court. 
The Guidelines suggest that highly controversial actions should al-
ways be covered in submitted impact statements.82 The substantial 
public dispute concerning the proposed Amchitka test could surely 
trigger NEPA applicability. 
A third problem with NEPA as a disclosure tool is the possible 
exception of the Environmental Protection Agency from certain of 
its requirements. In 1971, the CEQ put forward the theory that § 
102(2)(C) does not cover the EPA. Section 5(d) of the 1971 Guide-
lines read: 
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Because of the Act's legislative history, environmental protective reg-
ulatory activities concurred in or taken by the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency are not deemed actions which require the preparation of 
environmental statements under section l02(2)(C) of the Act.sa 
There has been considerable dispute over this matter, and recent 
legislation indicates that Congress is concerned about implied EPA 
exclusion. The Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 
197284 specifically exempt the EPA from impact statement require-
ments in many areas of the agency's water quality control program. 
However, EPA must prepare an impact statement concerning the 
issuance of discharge permits for new sources and the making of 
grants for publicly owned waste treatment works.85 Thus Congress 
appeared to state that the exclusion of EPA programs from impact 
statement requirements cannot be implied, but rather must be spe-
cifically stated by Congress. 
The exception of EPA is currently more doubtful because the 1973 
revised Guidelines entirely omit reference to the EPA exclusion.88 
Indeed, EPA has in practice submitted many impact statements 
regarding actions under its regulation.87 The present CEQ Guide-
lines and the actual compliance by EPA in submitting statements 
suggest that EPA is now considered to be subject to NEPA man-
dates. Surely the agency exerting perhaps the largest impact on 
environmental factors through its regulatory activities is not meant 
to escape NEPA's provisions. 
D. Toward Full Disclosure: NEPA As An Answer to the FOIA 
Exemptions. 
The provisions of NEPA may serve to narrow the restrictive ex-
emptions of the FOIA. The exemption for Executive-classified se-
crets is the more difficult exemption to overcome, because courts are 
apparently reluctant to apply NEPA in matters smacking of na-
tional security and military affairs. One example of this hesitation 
comes from the Tenth Circuit's opinion in McQueary v. Laird,88 a 
case in which plaintiffs sought an impact statement from the mili-
tary detailing the effects of continued storage of chemical and bac-
teriological warfare agents. The court held that public disclosure of 
information relating to military defense facilities via environmental 
impact statement created serious problems of national security. 89 
The court felt that traditional "unfettered control" of the internal 
management and operation of federal military establishments 
should be left to the federal government.oo 
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Two decisions may conflict with the McQueary ruling. In People 
of Enewetak v. Laird,8! the Federal District Court of Hawaii held 
that NEPA's requirements did apply to military detonation experi-
ments on the Enewetak Atoll. The court granted an injunction halt-
ing the military's Pacific Cratering Experiments until an adequate 
environmental impact statement was prepared. Although the expe-
riments were being conducted to test the vulnerability of strategic 
defenses to nuclear attack, and were supervised entirely by military 
personnel, the court found no national security concerns sufficient 
to prevent the application of NEPA. 
The case of Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Schlesinger92 
also discussed NEPA's application in this area. That action con-
cerned the sufficiency of an impact statement prepared by the 
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) regarding the same nuclear test-
ing off of Amchitka Island which concerned the Mink litigants. 
Plaintiffs, a citizen's group, sought an injunction in district court 
to halt the test because of the allegedly insignificant attention paid 
by the AEC to environmental dangers. On the day the test was 
scheduled to be made, the Supreme Court denied injunctive relief 
and the test proceeded with no further impact information being 
submitted. However, the Supreme Court did not deny the applica-
bility of § 102(2)(C). The inadequate time left for investigation and 
deliberation before the scheduled testing appeared to be the reason 
for the denial of the injunction.83 The Supreme Court order denying 
the injunction referred to the U.S. Court of Appeals decision which 
held: 
... Our failure to enjoin the test is not predicated on a conviction 
that the AEC complied with NEPA in setting forth dangers. The NEPA 
process-which is designed to minimize the likelihood of harm-has not 
run its course in the courts. We are in no position to calculate dangers 
from Cannikin testing.84 
Thus, the lower court directly, and the Supreme Court indirectly, 
required adherence to NEPA processes and impact statement re-
quirements. The testing at Amchitka proceeded, but agencies were 
given implied notice not to disregard NEPA even in such sensitive 
matters as military and national security affairs. 
The major difficulty in the application of NEPA to FOIA prob-
lems lies in these security matters. However, the inclination of 
courts seems to be to demand NEPA compliance in environmental 
disclosure cases. The Court of Appeals in the first of three opinions 
in Committee for Nuclear Responsibility said: 
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Plaintiffs also alleged the existence of reports by federal agencies 
recommending against [the project] specifically because of the poten-
tial harm to the environment. NEPA clearly indicates that the agency 
responsible for a project should obtain and release such adverse reports. 
If these reports exist, and they are not subject to some statutory exemp-
tion, plaintiffs must prevail on this contention as well,95 
The argument could arise that the FOIA restrictions may act as a 
"statutory exemption" for the reports requested. The Court of Ap-
peals referred to this issue in a footnote, stating: 
We do not consider whether the court may decline to order the release 
of agency comments. . .on the ground that they are exempt from public 
disclosure by virtue of exemptions set forth in the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, 5 U.S.C., Section 552 (1970), which should be transported into 
NEPA. No such grounds were presented to us at this time, and accord-
ingly we express no opinion thereon. u8 
There being no precedent of FOIA exemption applicability to NEPA 
impact statement provisions, judicial inclination toward disclosure 
in environmental cases might prevail. 
Justice Douglas, in an appendix to his opinion regarding the de-
nial of injunctive relief in the Amchitka case, voiced his view that 
no exemptions can be implied: 
Disclosure of these statements to the public by any federal agency 
which has 'special expertise with respect to any environmental impact 
involved,' is indeed required by Section 102(2)(C) of the Act. And the 
courts have consistently held that a defect in the Impact Statement 
presents a justiciable question and is the basis for equitable relief.U7 
Thus, under NEPA, environmental matters excluded by the exemp-
tions of the FOIA pertaining to classified materials, might be made 
available for public disclosure through impact statement prepara-
tion and submission. This approach could remedy a crucial defi-
ciency of the Freedom of Information Act. 
The requirement of full disclosure in impact statements under 
NEPA would apply especially to the areas excluded by Exemption 
5 of the FOIA. Impact statements must contain a detailed discus-
sion prescribed by § 102(2)(C).98 Agency compliance with full disclo-
sure requirements must be shown by reference in the impact state-
ment to relevant public contributions and by inclusion of all reason-
able alternatives to the agency action. 
In interpreting § 102(2)(C), the courts have required public con-
tribution in the preparation of impact statements-in addition to 
final full disclosure to the public. CEQ Guidelines have also set 
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stages in impact statement preparation where public input is re-
quired. Guideline 7 of the 1973 revised rules reads: 
... agencies have a responsibility to develop procedures to insure the 
fullest practicable provision of timely public information and under-
standing of Federal plans and programs with environmental impact in 
order to obtain the views of interested parties.'e 
The District Court for the District of Washington addressed itself 
to this issue in Lathan v. Volpe. loo That court found that the public 
could raise environmental questions by commenting on agency draft 
statements. Officials were to give more than cursory consideration 
to the public suggestions when preparing the final impact state-
ments. The court held that if final statements did not produce satis-
factory answers to reasonable and relevant public questions, they 
would not meet the minimal statutory requirements. IOI 
An effective way to remedy FOIA's shortcomings in disclosure is 
through these mandates. Public participation calls for public aware-
ness of the issues and information being discussed. It was suggested 
by one court that agency comments made prior to the issuance of 
the impact statement in final form must be included in impact 
statements by virtue of § 102 ofNEPA.lo2 Executive Order No. 11514 
(Protection and Enhancement of Environmental Quality), pursuant 
to NEPA, directed the heads of Federal agencies to: 
Develop procedures to ensure the fullest practicable provision of 
timely public information and understanding of Federal plans and pro-
grams with environmental impact in order to obtain the views of inter-
ested parties. These procedures shall include, whenever appropriate, 
provision for public hearings and shall provide the public with relevant 
information, including information on alternative courses of action. 103 
Thus, relevant internal agency memoranda were to be made avail-
able for public study. The CEQ Guidelines have addressed the issue 
of the applicability of the FOIA exemption of agency memoranda 
to the preparation of environmental impact statements. Section 
l1(d) of the 1973 Guidelines reads: 
The agency responsible for the environmental statement is also re-
sponsible for making the statement, the comments received, and any 
underlying documents available to the public pursuant to the provisions 
of the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C., sec. 552), without regard 
to the exclusion of intra-agency or inter-agency memoranda, when such 
memoranda transmit comments of Federal agencies on the environmen-
tal impact of the proposed action ... 104 (emphasis added). 
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Court interpretation, Executive Order and CEQ Guidelines would 
seem to indicate NEPA's potential as a disclosure tool in an area of 
FOIA exemption. 
Just as NEPA compels the disclosure of agency considerations, it 
also requires a showing of "good faith" in these considerations. In 
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. Atomic Energy 
Commission,l05 an action seeking review of an AEC order precluding 
consideration of various environmental issues, the District of Col-
umbia Circuit Court of Appeals required all agencies to use a "sys-
tematic, inter-disciplinary approach to environmental planning and 
evaluation, "101 and prescribed a balancing test to insure good faith 
considerations. The court held that agencies must: 
.. .identify and develop methods and procedures ... which will in-
sure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values 
must be given appropriate consideration in decision making along with 
economical and technical considerations ... In some instances environ-
mental costs may outweigh economic and technical benefits and in other 
instances they may not. But NEPA mandates a rather finely tuned and 
systematic balancing analysis in each instance. l07 
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers,108 and 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton,109 the courts 
discussed "good faith" considerations with regard to the inclusion 
within impact statements of alternatives to proposed actions as § 
102(2)(C)(iii) of the Act requires. In Environmental Defense Fund, 
an action for injunctive relief against any further contract negotia-
tion or construction work on a proposed dam across the Cos sa tot 
River, the court focused on alternatives which should be set forth 
in impact statements. The court stated that NEPA itself required 
agencies to: 
... study, develop and describe appropriate alternatives to recom-
mended courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved 
conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources. l1O 
An agency decision to reject its own proposed action was to be one 
of the alternative possibilities. J11 
In Natural Resources Defense Council, the court rejected a mere 
"listing" of alternatives. Rather, it held that NEPA was intended 
to require all alternatives to be developed in sufficient detail to 
permit reasoned choices on the part of responsible officials. 112 The 
discussion of reasonable alternatives need not be "exhaustive" as to 
all effects. Nevertheless, environmental aspects of alternatives 
which were "readily identifiable" by agencies, or meaningfully pos-
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sible, were to be included within the prepared impact statement. 113 
These balancing process requirements under NEPA afford an-
other disclosure mechanism. They supply distinct and identifiable 
standards for judicial review of the adequacy of impact statements 
which have been filed. They are different from and could remedy 
the vague standards for review under FOIA. 
A final disclosure deficiency of FOIA is the substantial time al-
lowed for agency response to requests for information. NEPA im-
plies limitations for agency submission of impact statements. The 
court in Calvert Cliffs explained that agencies must comply with 
NEPA in a timely and adequate manner: 
"Compliance to the 'fullest' possible extent would seem to demand that 
environmental issues be considered at every important stage in the deci-
sion making process concerning a particular action ... "114 
As the District Court in Daly v. Volpe,lI5 emphasized: 
Given the purpose of NEPA to insure that actions by federal agencies 
be taken with due consideration of environmental effects and with a 
minimum of such adverse effects, it is especially important ... that the 
statement be prepared early. 118 
Thus, the information-seeking litigant who invokes NEPA not only 
increases the availability of environmental information, but also 
hastens its disclosure. 
CONCLUSION 
Certainly the application of NEPA to areas previously off-limits 
under the Freedom of Information Act is a legally intricate proposi-
tion. Nevertheless, NEPA is a good disclosure tool for use in public 
interest litigation, and its attempted application to FOIA controver-
sies is important. What NEPA cases illustrate is the judicial incli-
nation to read that Act in the broadest, most reasonable disclosure-
oriented way. To assure accessibility to information concerning Fed-
eral agency processes, public interest groups should consider this 
potential of the National/Environmental Policy Act. 
It is appropriate to look to Mr. Justice Douglas' concluding re-
marks in EPA v. Mink: 
We should remember the words of Madison-
'A popular government, without popular information, or the means 
of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps 
both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean 
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to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which 
knowledge gives.'117 
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